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The challenges of late development have received scholarly attention for decades. As Gerschenkron's classic study of 19 th century Europe argued, 'backward' economies face distinct opportunities and challenges, including the challenge of competition from more advanced economies (Gerschenkron 1962) . In recent years, scholars have distinguished between latecomer development and latecomer innovation, and the particular challenges that the latter presents have come under scrutiny (Hobday, Rush, and Bessant 2004; L. Kim 1997; S.-Y. Kim 2012; Altenburg, Schmitz, and Stamm 2008) .
Simply put, it is one thing to become a 'fast-follower,' rapidly adopting the innovations of other countries, but quite another to go from fast-follower to innovation leader.
Despite the growing attention to latecomer innovation, we still lack a comprehensive theoretical framework to understand the policy challenges it presents. In the challenge of late innovation -and how it is changing -deserves greater scrutiny.
To address these questions, this article develops a theoretical framework that outlines the basic policy challenges faced by late innovators today. Simply put, it argues that the governments of late innovators must not only encourage greater and more research-intensive R&D but also limit their role in the supervision of R&D. The success with which late innovators surmount these challenges, in turn, shapes the extent to which they emerge as innovation leaders in their own right. The globalization of innovation has not rendered these reform challenges less relevant or important; instead, it has raised the stakes for late innovators as they confront them. Late innovators that reform successfully are poised to profit from integration with global networks. Unsuccessful reformers, in contrast, will find such integration more difficult. The advent of global innovation thus has not changed the basic reform challenges that late innovators face. It does, however, offer greater rewards for countries that reform successfully -and new challenges for those that do not.
The article applies this theoretical framework to explain the recent experiences of China and India as late innovators. It has been popular in recent years to compare these two emerging powers as new sites of innovation in the world economy (Fuller 2014; Chaudhuri 2012; Dahlman 2010; Altenburg, Schmitz, and Stamm 2008) . Even so, there is no consensus on how the two countries are faring (Kennedy 2015) . This article finds that China's progress is more impressive on multiple fronts. Compared with India, China has confronted the basic reform challenges of late innovation more successfully, has more impressive innovation outputs, and has integrated into global networks more successfully.
Even so, China's approach also has its weaknesses, and these are important obstacles to its emergence as an innovation leader.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The first section outlines a theoretical framework for understanding the policy challenges facing late innovators, particularly in an era in which innovation is globalizing. The second section compares how well China and India have confronted these challenges. The third section shows how China and India's different approaches have produced divergent outcomes in terms of innovation outputs, including both scientific publications and patents. The fourth section compares how China and India's distinct trajectories have positioned them within global networks. The article concludes by summing up the results and suggesting avenues for future research.
The Challenge of Latecomer Innovation
While late development can be viewed holistically, it is now popular to distinguish between distinct stages within this process. Scholars now distinguish between countries that are 'fast-followers' and those that are 'innovators' (S.-Y. Kim 2012) , between 'imitation' and 'innovation' (L. Kim 1997) and between 'production' and 'innovation' (Altenburg, Schmitz, and Stamm 2008) . In practice, of course, the dividing line between these categories can be rather blurry. Manufacturing firms in global production networks, for example, play a role in engineering new products. Moreover, the scope for innovation can grow as the transition is made from original equipment manufacturing (OEM), in which products are produced according to detailed designs, to original design manufacturing (ODM), in which only a basic design is provided in advance (Hobday 2000, 133-135) . Nonetheless, there is an important distinction to be made between economies dominated by OEM and ODM firms on the one hand and innovation leaders on the other. The economies of the latter are led by the original brand manufacturers (OBM) that define and market new products.
Amsden and Tschang highlight the difference between followers and leaders by distinguishing between five different types of R&D (Amsden and Tschang 2003) .
Innovation leaders lead in three types of research: pure science, basic research, and applied research. The first of these seeks to uncover new scientific principles, the second pursues knowledge with the intention of creating wholly new products, while the third seeks to differentiate new products 'on paper.' In contrast, firms in latecomer economies focus on two forms of development. The first is exploratory development, which involves engineering a detailed prototype based on applied research. The second is advanced development, which entails generating a prototype for manufacture. (OECD 2009, 103) . In contrast, Brazil's R&D spending tends to be driven by the public sector, and
(with a few exceptions) the R&D done by firms tends to focus on process innovations aimed at lowering production costs (Bound 2008, 77 How can the governments of latecomer economies promote the transition to innovation leadership? Despite the important contributions that have been made, the literature on latecomer innovation has yet to offer a comprehensive framework that outlines an answer to this question. This article argues that there is a particular balance that governments must strike as they support national R&D. To be clear, the following discussion is not concerned with how governments can promote late development in general, which is a broader question. 2 Nor is this discussion concerned with all of the potential obstacles to innovation in a given economy. Instead, the following paragraphs highlight the balance that governments of late developers must strike with regard to the promotion of R&D if they aspire to innovation leadership.
The first priority entails encouraging greater and more research-oriented R&D on the part of firms -an 'R&D take-off' (J. Gao and Jefferson 2007) . The potential for market failures to impede such investments have been appreciated for decades (Arrow 1962) . In this case, the challenge is not simply encouraging R&D but also encouraging a shift in the nature of R&D, as described above. A number of scholars have shown how governments drive this process forward in late developers (Amsden and Tschang 2003, 564-71; L. Kim 1997, 21-58; Breznitz 2007; Samuels 1994 protection is needed to encourage greater investments in R&D. As a result of these and other measures, governments may create more R&D-intensive economies, while also encouraging a shift from development to research within national R&D activity.
While the first shift involves more active government, the second entails less active government. As scholars of late development have argued, the process of catching-up often involves greater government intervention in the economy, including support for specific sectors and firms (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990) . At the technological frontier, however, such interventions can become problematic. The problem is not merely that there is an increased risk that government may back the wrong sectors or firms, since 'picking winners' is more difficult at the frontier. It is also that strong patron-client ties between government and the performers of R&D can develop, making connections -rather than merit -the key to winning support and denying opportunities to more innovative actors (Mahmood and Rufin 2005, 346) . Such patronclient ties can complicate development in any developing economy, but they are particularly pernicious in would-be innovation leaders, since the entry of new and disruptive actors is so crucial to innovation (Olson 2008, 62-65; Mokyr 1990, 261; Mahmood and Rufin 2005, 346-347) . Successful transitions, therefore, involve a retreating state. Fong provides a case in point by describing the receding role of the Japanese government in computer and semiconductor industries (Fong 1998 (Breznitz 2007, 13-15) . Other scholars concur with the notion that the interventionist policies appropriate for catch-up become problematic at the frontier (Drezner 2001, 19-22; Yeung 2014, 91; Dahlman and Andersson 2000, 41-42) .
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The globalization of innovation has not reduced the salience of these two basic reform challenges. It has, however, created opportunities and dangers for late innovators that did not exist before (Ernst 2009 ). More specifically, globalization offers rewards for late innovators that reform successfully and punishments for those that do not. Let us first consider the former. Latecomers that reform successfully position themselves to profit from global innovation. Investments in more advanced human capital enable learning from multinational corporations, while also mitigating against the danger that domestic firms will be deprived of well-educated workers. Such investments also create the potential for domestic workers to make more substantial contributions in multinational innovation networks. Greater and more research-intensive R&D spending by domestic firms also facilitates learning, while creating opportunities for domestic workers outside of foreign firms. Government restraint, meanwhile, helps ensure that these investments are as productive as possible, rather than undermined by patron-client ties.
Latecomers that fail to reform, in contrast, are poorly positioned to exploit these opportunities. Instead, they risk succumbing to what Dieter Ernst has called the "poisoned chalice" of global innovation (Ernst 2009, 38) . With a more limited supply of human capital, and smaller investments by domestic firms, there is less opportunity for learning, and the internal brain drain will loom larger as a problem. More limited human capital, along with weak intellectual property protection, also increases likelihood that foreign firms will conduct their more valuable R&D tasks elsewhere. Lastly, an interventionist government may compound these problems by reducing the productivity of the domestic investments that are made.
The two possibilities outlined above are ideal-typical, but they are useful as analytical tools, and they imply two very different developmental pathways. Latecomers that reform successfully should play growing roles in the production of original and valuable research. More specifically, national R&D in such cases should result in more scientific publications, as R&D becomes more science-based, and it should also result in more patents, as R&D becomes more focused on intellectual property. Foreign firms may play a role in national R&D in such cases, but not one that eclipses domestic firms.
In contrast, latecomers that fail to reform will maintain lower profiles in scientific publications and patents. Foreign firms will be less eager to incorporate such countries into their innovation plans, and foreign R&D centers will be more likely to drain talent away from domestic firms.
The Governance Transition
How are China and India managing the two governance challenges associated with late innovation? The following discussion focuses first on efforts to encourage science-based R&D and then on efforts to limit the state's supervision of R&D. The discussion finds that China has outperformed India with regard to the former, but that both countries have struggled with the latter, although in different ways.
Encouraging R&D
Neither China nor India were leading R&D investors at the turn of the century. In purchasing power parity terms, China's R&D spending was about $30 billion, while India was just under $14 billion, compared with more than $300 billion in the United States.
China's spending has exploded since then, however, while India's has increased more modestly. By 2011, China's R&D spending had reached $183 billion, while India's was slightly more than $32 billion, as shown in Figure India's government has repeatedly stated its hope of raising the country's R&D intensity, but it has not had anything like China's success. While this is partly a function of India's lower level of development, there is more to the story here. In fact, India's R&D intensity has hardly changed since 1990, when the country's per capita GDP was less than a quarter of it what it is today (Brandt and Rawski 2008, 295; IMF 2014; World Bank 2015) . Part of the problem is that India's programs to promote R&D have been plagued by a number of problems, which have limited the funds available and their availability to smaller enterprises (Krishnan 2010, 109-111) . In addition, India's R&D tax credit -while generous -has had limited impact because businesses struggle under an onerous and hard to predict regulatory environment. Smaller firms in particular devote significant resources to complying with (or avoiding) regulatory burdens, limiting the human and financial resources they have for investing in plants, machinery, and R&D (Ernst 2014, 43) . Indian industry has also complained that the government does too little to inform entrepreneurs of the incentives that are available ( is comparable to that in Japan and Korea, and considerably higher than that in China, this reflects the persistent dominance of government in India's national R&D spending, rather than a commitment on the part of business to conduct research-intensive R&D. In this regard, therefore, both China and India have some work to do.
The Role of the State
While investing in R&D is one matter, the direction of that investment is another.
To make the transition to innovation leadership, the governments of late developers must retreat from a dirigiste role in the economy, allowing firms and universities to take the lead in defining the research agenda. This point is relevant in both the Chinese and Indian cases. In both countries, the government was heavily involved in R&D decisions for decades following World War II. In China's case, the communist system precluded a private role in R&D, and the initial focus on nuclear weapons and missile technology left little room for other programs in any event. In the 1980s, China shifted to a more civilian focus, but the state continued to control where investments were made (Feigenbaum 2003, 164-188) . In India's case, nuclear and missile technologies also attracted great interest initially, but the state remained in control even outside these areas (Kennedy 2012, 204-205) . The Indian government set up a network of national laboratories under the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and these labs were charged with developing technologies to reduce the need for technology imports. This focus on import substitution continued into the 1980s. In both China and India, then, the state was highly involved in R&D throughout the Cold War period.
In recent decades, both China and India have moved away from the state-led model, but both countries have also struggled with this process, albeit in different ways.
Let us start with China. China's rapid shift to a system in which enterprises account for most of the country's rapidly growing R&D spending is striking. Nonetheless, the state- choice (Chen and Naughton 2013, 14) . In addition, eminent Chinese scientists called for an open funding system based on peer review, warning that otherwise China would 'get half the result with twice the effort' (Rao, Bai, and Tsou 2004, A12) . In the end, however, control of the research agenda remained firmly in the hands of government officials. In fact, the MLP prioritizes eleven 'key areas' and eight 'frontier technologies for support. The plan also promotes 16 'megaprojects' in particular, which range from manned space flights and lunar exploration to genetically modified organisms. 7 The latter are clearly a legacy of science planning in China (Cao, Suttmeier, and Simon 2006, 40) . Each of the megaprojects is supervised by a leadership small group, each of which includes representatives from multiple ministries (Chen and Naughton 2013, 15-16) .
Funding for the megaprojects has grown quickly. It was less than US$1 billion in 2008, but more than US$8 billion was allocated for 2014 (Qiu 2014; Chen and Naughton 2013, 17) .
In 2010, the Chinese government unveiled a new plan: the 'Strategic Emerging
Industries' (SEI) initiative. The initiative targeted seven areas, including next generation information technology, bio-technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new energy, new materials, new energy automobiles, and energy and environmental conservation.
The SEI was not intended to replace the MLP but to complement it, converting technological progress from the megaprojects into concrete commercial outcomes. In addition, the SEI differed from the MLP by envisioning a broader role for government:
whereas the megaprojects are government-funded, the SEI relies not only on public funding but also on more general efforts to create favorable conditions in which the emerging industries can grow (Chen and Naughton 2013, 19) . The Chinese government even stipulated how rapidly these sectors should develop. As of 2010, the seven sectors accounted for two to four percent of China's GDP (Naughton 2011, 325) . 2025. In short, the Chinese government is still clinging to its role in directing national innovation. Recent descriptions of China as a complex, "multi-driver" system seem appropriate (Fu 2015, 388) .
While India has not promulgated grand plans as China has, it has reformed its national R&D system more slowly than China has. Most of the country's R&D is still funded by the government, as noted above, and the majority of this goes to the strategic sectors of space, atomic energy, and defense. To be sure, there have been significant reforms. Reforms to CSIR in the 1980s, coupled with the liberalization of the Indian economy in the early 1990s, shifted the focus away from technological self-reliance and toward performing cutting-edge R&D that is relevant to industry (World Bank 2007, 64).
Laboratories became more autonomous and focused on tangible outputs, such as publications and patents, with the National Chemical Laboratory a particular success (Krishnan 2010, 121; Kale and Little 2007, 605 Energy Commission has put it more bluntly, "science and technology R&D investments in India are predominantly public sector driven with little input from the private sector, which seriously needs to change" (Pulakkat 2015) . Indeed, businesses still complain that programs at public research institutes are not aligned with the needs of industry. To address the problem, they have called for the institutes to create formal advisory boards with representatives from industry, and they have also suggested ways in which the Indian government can better promote R&D in the private sector itself (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 2014, 2). Scientists, meanwhile, complain of excessive bureaucratic control over their research activities, and of crippling and seemingly arbitrary funding cuts that can take place mid-year (Pulakkat 2015) . Prime
Minister Narendra Modi has vowed to improve matters, and his government has begun soliciting input for a new S&T policy, "Vision S&T 2020" (Government of India 2014b).
It remains to be seen what the new policy will entail, however, and how effectively it will be implemented.
To sum up this discussion of reform as a whole, it is apparent that China and India have taken different approaches to the challenge of late innovation. China has made a concerted and impressive effort to increase national R&D intensity, and its R&D system has become more market-led as businesses have come to the fore. Even so, the Chinese government has shown a continuing proclivity to direct -or at least to attempt to directwhere R&D investments are made. India, in contrast, has struggled both to increase the R&D intensity of its economy and to foster a more market-led system, though it has made some progress with regard to the latter. With these contrasting profiles in mind, let us turn to innovation outputs.
Innovation Outputs
How do China and India compare in innovation outputs? The following discussion finds that China and India's performance in these two areas is broadly consistent with their R&D governance. Overall, it finds that China has outpaced India in keeping with its much greater investment in R&D. Yet it also finds that China's performance is constrained by the aspects of its system that remain state-led, which have fostered the emergence of problematic patron-client ties.
Scientific Publications
Since the turn of the century, China's share of academic science and engineering with the U.S. accounting for 15 and Germany for seven (King and Pendlebury 2013, 18-19) . In another front that is relevant to cancer research, Jasmonate biosynthesis and signaling, the U.S. leads with 15 core papers, but China boasts the second-highest total with eight (King and Pendlebury 2013, 6-7) .
In short, China has outpaced India with regard to S&E publishing in general.
Nonetheless, serious problems remain in Chinese science. Some of these, such as plagiarism and risk-aversion, reflect government pressure to demonstrate productivity on an almost annual basis (Qiu 2014 ) India between 1999 and 2012. China's total has increased rapidly to nearly 1,000 triadic patents in 2012. While this remains well short of the U.S. figure for that year (12,722), the trend is impressive. In contrast, while India's total has increased, it has done so at a much more moderate pace. Moreover, India's rate of increase appears to have slowed after 2010. To sum the two trends up differently, China's total increased by a factor of 9.9 between 2001 and 2012, while India's increased by factor of 1.8.
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In both China and India, employees of foreign firms account for most of this triadic patenting activity (Branstetter, Li, and Veloso 2014) . If we focus on the overseas patenting of Chinese and Indian firms, however, China is still well ahead. The top Chinese firms have not only invested heavily in R&D but also made aggressive efforts to protect their intellectual property. Huawei's prolific patenting is well-known: by the end of 2012, the firm had been granted more than 30,000 patents worldwide (Huawei 2014) .
In 2013, the firm applied for 1,149 more patents from USPTO (U. Nonetheless, while Chinese firms are ahead of their Indian counterparts in the pursuit of intellectual property, problematic patron-client ties bedevil China's corporate innovation system. In the consortia that conduct megaproject research, for example, prominent SOEs have taken a greater role than other types of companies, even though these state enterprises are not China's most innovative firms. Whereas SASAC firms accounted for more than a quarter of national R&D spending in 2010, they accounted for only 9 percent of domestic patent applications and only 6 percent of patents received (Naughton 2012, 12 ). China's SOEs are also laggards in terms of patenting overseas, particularly when compared with firms like Huawei and ZTE, which were founded without investment from the central government. In short, while Chinese megaproject largesse gives a privileged role to SOEs, these are not the most innovative firms in the Chinese economy, even if foreign firms are excluded. In this context, it is not surprising that more dynamic firms that are involved in the megaprojects, such as Huawei, have complained about the restrictions and stated that they would prefer a more open system that allowed more collaboration with foreign firms (Liu and Cheng 2011, 34) .
Roles in Global Innovation
In a variety of ways, China and India have come to play more prominent roles in global innovation in recent years. As described below, foreign multinationals have integrated into more successfully into these networks than India has. China has attracted more interest from foreign firms, it is playing a more important role in global innovation overall, and it is less constrained by the internal brain drain challenge. Even so, China's record is hardly untarnished, as the following discussion will show.
Let us begin with China and India's relative prominence in global innovation.
Despite the nationalistic tone of China's MLP and SEI initiatives, the Chinese government has welcomed collaboration with foreign firms in R&D in recent years (Kennedy 2013) . While India also welcomes such collaboration, most estimates indicate that China hosts more foreign R&D centers than India does. One recent study, which focused on the 500 multinationals that spend the most on R&D worldwide, found that 385 had centers in China while 228 had centers in India (Zinnov 2013 world-class research in areas ranging from user interface, multimedia, data intensive computing, search, and computer science fundamentals (Lo 2014) . For its part, Cisco
India represents a major R&D effort featuring 17 of the company's 84 top engineers as of early 2014 (The Economic Times 2014). In other cases, however, the work is simply designed to adapt existing products to local markets. One prominent global wind power firm, for example, re-designed its gearbox in China to make it less expensive, but in doing so it cut the durability of the product in half (Anonymous 2013a) . Overall, however, recent research suggests that more impressive work is being done in China.
This research has compared the quality of patents (as measured by forward citations) filed with the USPTO by China-based and India-based employees of multinational firms (Branstetter, Li, and Veloso 2014, 29) . The results indicate that patents associated with Chinese inventors are of higher quality than those associated with Indian inventors. In fact, if one compares patents within the same company, those featuring Chinese inventors are equivalent in quality to those produced exclusively by inventors resident in the firm's home country. There appears to have been rapid improvement in the quality of patents filed by China-based employees of multinationals, but not in the patents filed by Indiabased inventors.
But if foreign firms are doing more work -and more important work -in China than in India, China's more successful promotion of R&D means that Chinese firms are better positioned to compete for domestic talent than Indian firms are. In the past, to be sure, Chinese scholars and officials have worried that foreign firms were luring the country's best and brightest away from domestic firms and research institutes (Breznitz and Murphree 2011, 106; Schwaag-Serger 2009, 59-60) . for example, but its talent is contained within foreign firms, which are focused on export markets, so little of this capability is disseminated locally (Ernst 2014, 7) .
China is also making a bigger impact in global networks as its technology firms invest overseas. R&D spending by Chinese firms in the U.S., for example, has increased rapidly from virtually nothing in 2007 to $366 million in 2011 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014a). While R&D spending by Indian firms has increased as well, it has done so more modestly, from $6 million to $39 million, over the same period. California in particular has been a magnet for Chinese IT companies, with both Huawei and ZTE opening R&D centers in the state in recent years (Rosen and Hanemann 2012, 35 and 50) .
While data for Chinese and Indian R&D spending in the EU are not available, Chinese States in 2015 to address concerns about its industrial espionage. Even so, serious concerns persist, and the extent to which the agreement will reduce them in the future remains unclear (Shalal 2015) .
Conclusion
This article has argued that late innovators face two basic policy challenges. On the one hand, they must encourage greater and more research-intensive R&D spending.
On the other hand, they must limit government supervision of R&D. The success with which late innovators confront these challenges, in turn, shapes their performance in the production of original and valuable research. The globalization of innovation has not rendered these challenges less important; on the contrary, it has raised the stakes for late innovators as they confront them. Late innovators that reform successfully are poised to profit from global integration, while the unsuccessful will find such integration more challenging.
This theoretical framework illuminates the recent experiences of China and India as late innovators. Overall, China's reform effort has been more successful. In particular, China has been far more successful at encouraging greater R&D spending, particularly among enterprises, and it has generated a greater supply of human capital in S&E fields. Consistent with this difference, China has performed more impressively than India in scientific publications and patenting activity. Generally speaking, China has also integrated more productively than India has into global innovation networks. Yet China has also paid a price for the government's continuing intervention in the management of R&D. There is evidence of problematic patron-client ties both in scientific research and in corporate innovation. Such problems limit the efficiency with which R&D spending is translated into innovation outputs, and this weakness may become more serious in years to come, especially if China's economy continues to cool and resources become more constrained. In addition, the extent of industrial espionage in China in recent years has generated considerable alarm among foreign firms, which may limit how prominent the country becomes in global innovation in the future.
These findings speak to other studies that have explored the political economy of innovation in China and India in recent years. With respect to China, this study agrees with recent critiques of the government's nationalistic management of R&D policy (Breznitz and Murphree 2011; Naughton 2011) . It also accords with studies that have criticized China as preoccupied with increasing inputs to innovation rather than the efficiency with which these inputs are used (Deiaco and Jeding 2015; Fu 2015, 350-52) .
It disagrees with the notion that China is mired in 'technological stagnation,' however, as its most ardent critics have suggested (Beckley 2012, 69) . Instead, this study suggests that China has made remarkable progress in some respects, even as it has struggled in others. With respect to India, this study concurs with recent critiques of the government's failure to promote R&D more effectively (Krishnan 2010, 61-140) . It also concurs with studies that have contrasted Chinese and Indian corporate business models and linked them to national innovation performance (Chaudhuri 2012 ). It does not fault Indian firms for following less ambitious paths, however, but rather highlights the incentives they face and the environment in which they are operating. The study also challenges the idea that India needs to emulate China's interventionist approach to R&D management. It is China's encouragement of R&D in general that India ought to emulate, not its micromanagement of where investments are made.
Future research should explore in more detail the conditions that give rise to successful transitions in late innovators. More research on the role of regime type would be particularly welcome. Is it the case that autocratic or post-communist governments are more capable of generating an R&D take-off, but that they also tend to intervene in R&D management, as the Chinese case suggests? Or is this outcome dependent on other factors that distinguish China from India? In addition, more research on how global innovation networks promote or constrain development in late innovators is warranted.
While a number of recent studies have explored the spillover effects of foreign R&D centers in China and India, there is no consensus at present as to the net benefits for host economies (Fu and Gong 2011; Marin and Sasidharan 2010; Basant and Mani 2012; Quan 2010) . This study has argued there is no uniform effect; success and failure depend upon the kinds of reforms adopted by the host country. In that sense, it demonstrates that today's late innovators are not at the mercy of multinationals, but retain an important degree of agency as they strive for technological leadership.
Notes
1 Amsden and Tschang note that the first government labs in latecomer economies typically focused on basic or applied research and preceded centralized R&D in private firms. Their point is not that such efforts must be revived, since they were typically unproductive or focused on defense priorities, but that firms must move beyond a preoccupation with forms of R&D that are tightly coupled to manufacturing (Amsden and Tschang 2003, 557) .
2 Scholars often note that access to foreign technology is an important ingredient in late development and late innovation, for example. The focus here, however, is on new challenges that late developers confront as they seek to become innovation leaders.
3 One recent study of mobile broadcasting in South Korea (S.-Y. Kim 2012) suggests that government may not need to retreat so much as develop more specialized, expert agencies that can manage innovation in specific areas. This solution appears highly demanding in terms of government capacity, however, making it difficult to replicate. 4 Following the practice of the U.S. National Science Foundation, this article relies on UNESCO R&D data because it makes spending figures available in constant dollars and purchasing power parity terms.
5 China's total did not include various Chinese firms incorporated in the Cayman islands, such as Tencent (#195) and Baidu (#322).
6 These data are for large-and medium-sized private firms in particular.
7 Three of the projects have not been disclosed and are believed to serve military purposes.
